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Abstract
Economists have developed theoretical models identifying self-fulfilling expectations as an important
source of statistical discrimination practices in labor markets (Arrow, 1973). The static models dominating
the literature of statistical discrimination, however, may leave the false impression that a bad equilibrium is
as fragile as a “bubble” and can burst at any moment when expectations flip. Such models thus understate
the adversity that disadvantaged groups face in seeking to escape bad equilibria. By developing a dynamic
version of a statistical discrimination model based on Coate and Loury’s (1993) original setup, we clarify the
limits of expectations-related fragility. We show that when a group is strongly affected by negative reputa-
tional externalities, the group cannot escape a low skill investment trap, regardless of how expectations are
formed. By examining the evolution of stereotypes in this way, we also provide new insights into egalitarian
policies.
Keywords: Statistical Discrimination, Collective Reputation, Reputation Trap, Forward-Looking Behavior.
JEL Codes: D63, D82, J15, J70
∗We are grateful to Rajiv Sethi, Oded Galor and Kenneth Chay for helpful comments and suggestions. We also thank the
participants at various seminars and conferences for valuable comments, which include the ninth conference of Public Economic
Theory, the Applied Microeconomics Seminar at Brown University, CEP/LSE Labour Seminar at the London School of Economics
and Political Science(LSE) and Labour & Applied Microeconometrics Seminar at Oxford University.
†Department of Economics and Finance, Sangmyung University, Hongjimun 2-gil, Jongno-gu, Seoul 110-743, South Korea.
Email: yckim.kdi@gmail.com.
‡Department of Economics, Box B, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912, USA. Email: Glenn Loury@brown.edu.
1 Introduction
Statistical discrimination is a theory of inequality among demographic groups, where discrimination is based
on stereotypes that do not arise from prejudice. When rational, information-seeking decision makers use aggre-
gate group characteristics to evaluate relevant personal characteristics of individuals with whom they interact,
individuals from different groups may be treated differently, even if they share identical observable character-
istics (Moro, 2009). Economists have developed theoretical models identifying self-fulfilling expectations as an
important source of statistical discrimination as practiced in labor markets.
Most notably, Arrow (1973) identified the ingredients for the existence of multiple equilibria, in which
principals have different self-confirming beliefs about different social groups with identical fundamentals. Coate
and Loury (1993) extend Arrow’s approach and present a theory of discrimination in job assignment, where
two ex ante identical groups may end up in different, Pareto-ranked, skill investment equilibria. As in Arrow’s
model, discrimination is generated by coordination failure: the disadvantaged group fails to coordinate on the
good equilibrium. When employers expect (correctly) that fewer workers in some visibly distinct group invest in
human capital, employers use more stringent hiring standards that, in equilibrium, provide lower incentives to
invest in human capital, fulfilling the original expectation. Thus, when groups coordinate on different equilibria,
the model displays inequality across ex-ante identical groups.
A rich literature followed these early contributions based on the standard statistical discrimination frame-
works, including a general equilibrium model with endogenous wages (Moro and Norman, 2004), an analysis
of an economy with public and private sectors (Fang and Norman, 2006), an examination of the possibility of
belief flipping in the promotion stage (Fryer, 2007) and a study of social integration and negative stereotypes
(Chaudhuri and Sethi, 2008).
The static models that dominate the literature, however, produce the unintended impression that group
inequality would be fully eliminated if the disadvantaged group and firms could somehow revise their beliefs
and expectations and coordinate on the good equilibrium. Static models suggests a simple change in expectations
can trigger a sudden shift in behavior of employers and the disadvantaged group members, leading to equality.
The models may even produce the impression that a bad equilibrium is as fragile as a “bubble” and can burst
at any moment when expectations flip. Finally, and most importantly, this misperception may understate the
adversity a disadvantaged group faces in escaping a bad equilibrium.
Additionally, static models, by their very nature, do not explicitly consider how the average investment level
of a group might evolve over time and, consequently, cannot explain under what conditions stereotypes leading
to permanent inequality might arise. So, the policy implications of static models are somewhat limited.
Seeking to overcome these shortcomings, we suggest a dynamic version of the statistical discrimination model
based on Coate and Loury’s original setup. Dynamics are added to this setup by assuming, in a continuous time
set-up, that older workers retire and are replaced with new workers at the same rate. These new members—
maximizing the total discounted value of future payoffs—are forward-looking. Their investment decisions are
based on how they anticipate their group will be treated in the future. As new members are born and older
members disappear, employers’ beliefs about a group’s average productivity are revised over time, leading
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to cross-generational linkages in agents’ incentives to invest. While the steady states of our dynamic model
essentially replicate the equilibria of static models, the process of revision just described provides insights
regarding the stability of equilibria and the paths that lead to different steady states when a group’s average
investment level is out of equilibrium.
Using the characterization of steady states and their converging paths, we can identify an “overlap” range—
that is, a set of initial conditions that give rise to multiple dynamic equilibrium paths leading to both high and
low levels of human capital in the steady states. Outside the overlap, however, there exist unique converging
paths that lead to either high- or low-level human capital steady states. This formalizes the intuition that
discriminatory outcomes may be persistent and that discriminated groups may be trapped by the negative
influence of reputational externalities: that is, under certain conditions which we are able to identify, no change
in expectations about the future can affect the behavior of disadvantaged group members.
Thus, our analysis clarifies the limits of the above-noted expectations-related fragility, providing conditions
for the persistence of statistical discrimination. Under this dynamic perspective, if the initial collective repu-
tation of a disadvantaged group is too unfavorable—that is, below the overlap range—then the group cannot
escape the bad equilibrium, regardless of how expectations are formed.
In addition, we provide a more intuitive analysis of the workings of some egalitarian policies by examining
the forward-looking decision-making behaviors of principals and agents. Outside the overlap range, when a
group is trapped by a negative reputational externality, any collective action to manage expectations would
be ineffective, and the group cannot escape a low human capital investment rate in the absence of some other
concerted external intervention. For instance, in this scenario, a policy of temporary affirmative action may
advance the group’s skill level into the overlap range, thereby initiating a recovery of reputation. It is worth
noting that in our dynamic framework, if the goal is to ensure that group equality eventually obtains, then any
egalitarian polices designed to benefit the group can be withdrawn once the group escapes the reputation trap.
If a disadvantaged group’s initial condition is within the overlap range, however, an active state role may not
be necessary to achieve the recovery of the group’s reputation. Instead, an emphasis on coordinated optimism
could be pursued to achieve the end. (Young members of the group will not increase their human capital
investment if they continue to take a pessimistic view of the group’s future.) The decisive role of collective
optimism as a coordinating device among group members is often ignored in contemporary policy debates.
Just as a persistent negative reputation for a group can be self-fulfilling prophecy in the bad steady state, so
too can the optimism needed for the reputational recovery be self-justifying: if newly entering group members
are sufficiently optimistic about the future to invest in human capital at a high enough rate, then the group’s
reputation can be improved to the point that future employers have the incentive to treat its members in a
favorable manner, thereby justifying their optimism. Various social entities, such as civic organizations, religious
groups and government offices, may all contribute to the encouragement of shared optimism.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the relevant literature
and explain its relationship to our dynamic model. In Section 3, we incorporate dynamics into the simplified
statistical discrimination model of Coate and Loury (1993) and describe a primary implication of the feasibility
of the dynamic reputation recovery path. In Section 4, we propose a formal dynamic system with differential
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equations and identify both overlap and reputation trap ranges. Section 5 follows with a discussion of the
properties of dynamic equilibrium paths and policy interventions from a dynamic perspective. Section 6 presents
the study’s conclusions.
2 Relevant Literature
In contrast to the rich literature on static models of statistical discrimination developed in the past few decades,
the literature on the dynamic evolution of discrimination is sparse. As a result, our understanding of the
evolution of stereotypes remains relatively poor, as summarized in Fang and Moro (2011). Nevertheless, there
have been several important developments in recent years that are worthy of discussion in relation to our
dynamic model.
Blume (2006) adds learning dynamics to a simplified version of Coate and Loury’s model of statistical
discrimination. Firms’ beliefs regarding the productivity of a group are revised for each new cohort based on
firms’ collective experiences with the previous cohort, and workers’ beliefs about labor market conditions are
similarly updated. Presenting an asymptotic analysis of the long-run behavior of employment outcomes and
agents’ beliefs for each parameter level, Blume identifies which equilibria are robust or stochastically stable
to small individual-level randomness. Although his approach differs significantly from ours—which relies on
economic agents’ forward-looking behaviors—the two approaches share common ground in that both seek to
identify which equilibria are robust in a long-term horizon, given multiple static equilibria. For instance, both
emphasize that, under some circumstances, a low skill investment rate can be a robust equilibrium that cannot
be escaped by a disadvantaged group in the absence of external intervention.
Antonovics (2006) presents a dynamic model of statistical discrimination that accounts for intergenerational
income mobility. When income is transmitted across generations through parental investment in the human
capital of children, statistical discrimination can lead racial groups with low endowments of human capital to
become trapped in an inferior stationary equilibrium because future discrimination lowers parents’ incentives
to invest in their children’s human capital. As a result, racial discrimination and racial wage inequality can be
self-reinforcing. Although her approach and ours both utilize an overlapping-generations framework to prove
the existence of a low human capital investment trap, the underlying forces differ in that the trap in her model
originates from the discouragement of parental investment in human capital, while in ours, it arises from the
negative influence of the collective reputation of previous cohorts.
Finally, Tirole (1996) explains persistent patterns of behavior, such as the prevalence of hard work and
corruption, in professional groups when agents care about their own individual reputations and the behavior
and reputations of their peers. Although his paper is not about discriminatory practices but societal behavior,
his approach and ours have many similarities: group members make binary decisions (whether to cheat or
invest) and firms’ hiring decisions are partly based on their beliefs about the average behavior of the group.
Both studies show the persistence of a poor collective reputation by proving that the more efficient steady state
may be unattainable if initial conditions are poor. The difference is that, in our model, for certain initial states
(in the so-called overlap region), groups can converge to either the high-reputation state or the low-reputation
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state, depending on whether group members have an optimistic or a pessimistic view of the future. This
point is important from a policy perspective because groups can become trapped, even when the more efficient
steady state is attainable, if their members’ collective expectations about the future remain pessimistic. The
importance of coordinated expectations is neglected both in Tirole (1996) and in Levin’s (2009) subsequent
dynamic framework, which illustrates stochastic versions of Tirole’s and Coate and Loury’s models, allowing
the cost of effort to evolve randomly, following driftless Brownian motion.
In the development of the dynamics, we are indebted to Krugman’s (1991) insight regarding the interpretation
of multiple self-confirming equilibrium paths. He denoted the range of multiple equilibrium paths by overlap
in his influential argument for the relative importance of history and expectations in the determination of final
economic outcomes. Within an overlap, the final state is determined by expectations about the future, while
outside the overlap, it is determined by history. We incorporate his general arguments into the dynamic structure
of statistical discrimination. Unlike his model, however, which assumes a fixed population, our dynamic model
is developed in an overlapping-generations framework. We emphasize the importance of belief coordination over
a long-term horizon: expectations coordinated across different time cohorts impact the dynamic self-confirming
path to be taken. In this regard, we open the door to a discussion of how to address cross-generational belief
coordination in terms of the human capital development of demographic groups.
3 A Dynamic Setup of Statistical Discrimination
In this section, we propose a dynamic set-up of the job assignment model introduced by Coate and Loury
(1993). To illustrate how a group’s collective reputation evolves over time, we present the simplest possible
fixed-wage market equilibrium model. Imagine a large number of identical employers and a larger population
of workers, with each employer randomly matched to many workers from this population. Employers assign
each worker to one of two jobs, referred to as Task One and Task Zero. Task One is the more demanding and
rewarding assignment: workers receive a gross benefit of ω per unit period if assigned to Task One. All workers
prefer to be assigned to Task One, whether they are qualified for the task. Employers gain a net return of
xq per unit period if they assign a qualified worker to Task One and suffer a net loss of xu per unit period if
they assign an unqualified worker to Task One. Define ρ ≡ xq/xu as the ratio of net gain to net loss. For the
sake of simplicity, a worker’s gross returns and an employer’s net return from an assignment to Task Zero are
normalized to zero: the less demanding task with an insignificant reward is performed equally well by qualified
and unqualified agents.
Consider an identity group with a large population of workers. Each worker is subject to the “Poisson death
process” with parameter λ: in a unit period, each individual faces a probability of dying of λ. We assume that
the total population of each identity group is constant at N i for group i, implying that a fraction λ of the
group’s population is replaced by newborn group members in each unit period. Each newborn group member
makes a skill investment decision in the early stage of his life and then works for the rest of his life. Only
those who make some ex ante skill investment are qualified for Task One. The cost of obtaining a skill varies
among the newborns. We assume the simplest form of the cost distribution where each cohort is composed of
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three types of agents, as in other dynamic frameworks suggested by Tirole (1996) and Blume (2006): Πl is the
proportion of workers whose investment cost is very small and close to zero, 1−Πh is the proportion of workers
whose investment cost is very high and beyond the highest possible benefit from skill investment, and Πh −Πl
is the proportion of workers whose investment cost is intermediate and fixed as cm. The cost distribution G(c)
is then Πl for c ∈ (², cm) and Πh for c ∈ [cm,K), for a very large number K.
3.1 Labor Market Composition
The labor market is composed of two parts: the so-called temporary job market and the permanent job market.
After the skill investment period, each worker enters the temporary job market in which his qualification is
not yet known to employers and thus employers cannot determine whether a job candidate is qualified for Task
One. Employers, however, observe each candidate’s group identity and a noisy signal θ, the distribution of
which depends on whether he is qualified. The signal might be the result of a test, an interview, or some form
of on-the-job monitoring: it is distributed for a qualified worker as fq(θ) and for an unqualified worker as fu(θ),
where Fq(θ) ≤ Fu(θ) for all θ. Without knowing a worker’s true qualification, employers’ assignment decisions
depend entirely on both the group identity i and the signal θ of a job candidate.
We assume that in the temporary job market, the job contract between a worker and a randomly-matched
employer is short-term and that there is a very high turnover rate so that workers must recontract with different
employers in each short-term period. We further assume that there is no “memory” of individual workers and
that employers cannot perfectly distinguish the dates at which job candidates invested in skills. Therefore,
newborn workers are “mixed” with the rest of the group population, and “age” becomes another source of
imperfect information that makes the behavior of previous cohorts relevant to decisions made today, as in other
collective reputation models, such as Tirole (1996) and Levin (2009).1
At some point, however, the true characteristics of each worker are revealed to employers. We assume that
as a worker spends more time in the temporary job market, the worker’s true capabilities are more likely to be
revealed under the Poisson process with parameter η: a worker in the temporary job market reveals his true
quality with probability η in each unit period. Once his true capabilities are revealed, he leaves the temporary
job market and joins the permanent job market, where he secures a permanent job and is assigned to a task
according to his qualifications: Task One, if qualified; Task Zero, otherwise. Thus, the permanent job market is
composed of relatively older workers, while the temporary job market is composed of relatively younger workers.
Finally, we assume that the size of the temporary job market and that of the permanent job market are
fixed: a fraction n of all workers are in the temporary job market, while a fraction (1 − n) of all workers are
in the permanent job market. Among group i members, inflows into the temporary job market within a short
time period ∆t are N iλ∆t, and outflows from the market are N in(η∆t+ λ∆t− ηλ∆t2). Because we assume a
fixed population in the temporary job market, the following holds: λ = nη + nλ− nηλ∆t. Taking the limit as
1If “age” is perfectly observable, a cohort’s investment decision is not affected by the group’s collective reputation. Therefore,
the complementarity between employers’ beliefs and the cohort’s investment fully determine the economic outcome. No dynamic
framework may be applicable in that case.
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∆t→ 0, we obtain the following condition:
λ+ η =
λ
n
(≡ λ′), (1)
where λ′ indicates the rate at which the population in the temporary job market is replaced by newborn group
members: λ′ ≡ λ+ η.
3.2 Employers’ Assignment Decision
In the following discussion, we focus on the temporary job market in which between-group unequal treatment
occurs via job assignment decisions by employers. Consider an example from Coate and Loury(1993), where the
job market screening process produces only three outcomes: “pass,” which is achieved only by those who are
qualified; “fail,” which is achieved only by those who are not qualified; and “unclear,” which can be achieved
by either group but is less likely to be achieved if the worker is unqualified. That is, the screening process is
more effective in identifying the unqualified than the qualified.
To describe the three possible outcomes, we adopt the simplest signal functions: fu(θ) is uniformly dis-
tributed in [0, θu], and fq(θ) is uniformly distributed in [θq, θ¯], where θq < θu. If the signal is below θq, the
worker must be unqualified, and if the signal is above θu, the worker must be qualified. If the signal is between
θq and θu, the signal cannot indicate the true characteristic of the worker. Let us denote the probability that
if a worker does invest, his test outcome proves that he is qualified by Pq(= θ¯−θuθ¯−θq ). Similarly, let us denote the
probability that if a worker does not invest, his test outcome proves that he is unqualified by Pu(=
θq
θu
).2
In this environment, we know that employers will assign all who “pass” to the more valued task (Task One)
and all who “fail” to the less valued task (Task Zero). Additionally, we know that the employer accords the
“benefit of the doubt” (BOD) to a worker with an “unclear” test result by assigning him or her to Task One.
Let ξτ ∈ [0, 1] denote the probability that a worker will receive the benefit of the doubt in the event that this
worker presents an “unclear” test result at time τ in the temporary job market. When BOD is given, the
expected net return from investing in human capital is ωPu, and ωPq otherwise, given a wage rate of ω for Task
One. Then the expected return from investing in human capital accrued at time τ in the temporary job market
(βτ ) is summarized by a function of ξτ :
βτ (ξτ ) = ω(Pq + ξτ (Pu − Pq)). (2)
As we assume that the unqualified are more effectively screened, the following holds: 0 < Pq < Pu < 1.
Therefore, the net return βτ (ξτ ) is increasing in the probability that the worker receives the benefit of the
doubt (ξτ ). It is notable that if the opposite assumption holds (0 < Pu < Pq < 1), the expected net return to
the skill investment βτ (ξτ ) is decreasing in the probability that the worker receives the benefit of the doubt: the
greater net return is expected to be accrued when the group is more likely to fail to achieve employers’ favor.
2For improved disposition of the equations, we slightly alter the notation of Coate and Loury (1993). While they denote the
probability that if a worker does (does not) invest, his test outcome proves that he is qualified (unqualified) by 1− pq (1− pu), we
use the notation Pq (Pu) to denote this probability.
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This is not an ordinary economy that we examine.
What about the employer’s decision to give the worker the benefit of the doubt? The stronger is the group’s
collective reputation in the job market, the more likely employers are to give workers the benefit of the doubt.
In the given economy, they will give the benefit of the doubt if and only if the expected net return from doing
so is non-negative: xq · Prob[qualified|θ]− xu · Prob[unqualified|θ] ≥ 0, for θq ≤ θ ≤ θu. Using Bayes’ rule, the
posterior probability that the worker with group identity i and an unclear signal (θq ≤ θ ≤ θu) is qualified is
Πi(1−Pq)
Πi(1−Pq)+(1−Πi)(1−Pu) (= Prob[qualified|θ]), given the employers’ belief about the proportion of qualified workers
(Πi) among group imembers in the temporary job market. The above inequality is equivalent to the requirement
that Πi ≥ Π∗, where Π∗ ≡ 1−Puρ(1−Pq)+1−Pu with ρ =
xq
xu
. That is, the benefit of the doubt is given only when
the “collective reputation” of the identity group to which a worker belongs is equivalent to or exceeds some
threshold level Π∗, in that ξτ = 1 for Πτ ≥ Π∗, while ξτ = 0 for Πτ < Π∗. Thus, a worker receives the benefit
of the doubt if and only if the employer is sufficiently optimistic about the rate of human capital acquisition in
the population from which the worker is drawn.
3.3 Workers’ Skill Investment
Likewise, in this environment, a worker will acquire human capital if and only if that worker’s cost of human
capital acquisition is not greater than the anticipated net return. We assume that time is continuous and
that workers discount future receipts at a rate δ > 0. All workers also face the instantaneous probability
λ∆t of “dying” during time interval (t, t + ∆t). Workers in the temporary job market face the instantaneous
probability η∆t of revealing their true capabilities and, consequently, joining the permanent job market during
time interval (t, t+∆t). We further assume that newborn group members replacing “dying” workers must make
their human capital investment decisions at the moment of birth and cannot alter such decisions subsequently.
Thus, newborns either invest in human capital or not, based on whether the expected discounted net return
from doing so is greater or less than that worker’s investment cost, c.
Now, imagine that workers formulate expectations concerning employers’ future behavior, which, for our
purposes, can be fully described by the time-varying function ξτ : {ξeτ}∞t . Then a worker newly born at time t
anticipates an expected present discounted return to human capital investment as a function of the anticipated
future behavior of employers, R({ξeτ}∞t ):
R({ξeτ}∞t ) = (Return in Temporary Job Market) + (Return in Permanent Job Market)
=
∫ ∞
t
[βτ (ξeτ ) · e−η(τ−t)]e−(δ+λ)(τ−t)dτ +
∫ ∞
t
[ω · (1− e−η(τ−t))]e−(δ+λ)(τ−t)dτ.
=
∫ ∞
t
[βτ (ξeτ ) · e−(δ+λ+η)(τ−t)]dτ +
ηω
(δ + λ)(δ + λ+ η)
, (3)
where e−η(τ−t) indicates the probability that a worker’s true capabilities are not yet revealed over the time
interval (t, τ − t). For notational simplicity, we denote the level of the net return in the permanent job market
by ω′(≡ ηωδ+λ ). Thus, using the compressed notation, λ′ and ω′, the above expected present discounted return
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is expressed in simpler form by
R({ξeτ}∞t ) =
∫ ∞
t
[βτ (ξeτ ) · e−(δ+λ
′)(τ−t)]dτ +
ω′
δ + λ′
. (4)
Now, it is the complementarity between a group’s reputation and its members’ human capital incentives that
creates the possibility of multiple self-confirming reputations. Noting that R({0}∞t ) = ωPq+ω
′
δ+λ′ and R({1}∞t ) =
ωPu+ω
′
δ+λ′ , we have the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Assuming that ωPq+ω
′
δ+λ′ < cm <
ωPu+ω
′
δ+λ′ , if the following inequality holds, then both Πl and Πh are
equilibrium group reputations in the given model:
G(R({0}∞t )) = Πl < Π∗ < G(R({1}∞t )) = Πh. (5)
First, imagine that a group’s current reputation, that is, the employers’ belief about the rate of human
capital acquisition among the group’s population, is Πl in the temporary job market. If newborns believe that
employers will withhold the benefit of the doubt forever (that is, {ξeτ}∞t = {0}∞t ), then current newborns invest
in human capital acquisition at the rate Πl because G(R({0}∞t )) = Πl, thus maintaining a poor collective
reputation. As the newborns that follow continue to hold the same expectations regarding the future behavior
of employers, they will also invest at the rate Πl, and the current reputation Πl becomes a steady state. The
benefit of the doubt is then denied forever, self-confirming the workers’ earlier pessimistic expectations regarding
employers’ future behavior. Secondly, imagine that a group’s current reputation is Πh in the temporary job
market. An analogous explanation can be given for the high reputation equilibrium Πh, in which workers’
expectations that employers will give them the benefit of the doubt forever is self-confirmed.
In the following discussion, we assume that the above lemma holds, so that both equilibrium group rep-
utations, Πl and Πh, exist. Therefore, different groups may undertake differing equilibrium human capital
investments, exhibit contrasting levels of employment in the more demanding job, and obtain different av-
erage returns to skill investment, despite having identical fundamentals with respect to investment cost and
information technology.
3.4 Reputation Recovery
Our primary focus is the recovery path from the low equilibrium reputation Πl to the high equilibrium repu-
tation Πh. Is it possible that a group with a low reputation can recover its reputation through increased skill
investment? Yes, it is possible under some limited conditions. If newborns expect that while their group is
being denied the benefit of the doubt today, they may still be extended this benefit in the future, and if the
anticipated date at which employers’ behavior will shift is not too distant in the future, then newborns may
wish to acquire human capital at a higher rate than Πl. This enhanced human capital acquisition may raise
the groups’ reputation sufficiently that employers would, indeed, change their treatment of the group at some
point in the future.
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That is, there may exist a date T > 0 such that ξt = 0 for t < T and ξt = 1 for t ≥ T . The poorer is the
initial collective reputation Πl or, equivalently, the larger is the distance between Πl and Π∗, the more time T
may be required for employers to change their treatment of the group. Anticipating that current and subsequent
newborns enhance each cohort’s skill investment rate up to Πh and that the benefit of the doubt will be given
beginning at date T , the return to human capital acquisition for a current newborn worker at time t = 0 is
R({ξeτ}∞0 ) =
∫ T
0
[βτ (0) · e−(δ+λ′)τ ]dτ +
∫ ∞
T
[βτ (1) · e−(δ+λ′)τ ]dτ + ω
′
δ + λ′
=
1
δ + λ′
{
ωPq + ω′ + (ωPu − ωPq)e−(δ+λ′)T
}
. (6)
Current newborns will invest at the rate Πh if and only if the above return is not less than cm. Subsequent
newborn cohorts sharing the same optimistic expectations will then continue to invest at the high rate because
the anticipated date at which employers’ behavior shifts will be still less distant for them.
However, it is important to acknowledge that the recovery path is not always feasible. If the above return is
smaller than cm, current newborns have no incentive to enhance their human capital acquisition. That is, if the
current reputation level Πl is so low that even with increased skill investment, employers’ change of treatment
is seen as far in the future for current newborns, the medium cost newborns will stop investing in skills and
the group’s collective reputation will never improve. In this case, we may say that the group is stuck in a
“reputation trap.”
The above discussion can be summarized by the following lemma:
Lemma 2. The conjectured dynamic recovery equilibrium exists if and only if the conjectured time T at which
employers shift their treatment of the low reputation group satisfies the following condition:
R({ξeτ}∞0 ) ≥ cm ⇐⇒ T ≤
1
δ + λ′
ln
(
ωPu − ωPq
(δ + λ′)cm − ωPq − ω′
)
. (7)
Therefore, the key problem is to characterize the circumstances under which reputational recovery can occur
in the dynamic equilibrium of the model such that newborns’ optimism about the future enables a group’s
reputation to recover from the initial low state within a finite period of time. For this purpose, we must find
the determinants of the shift time T at which employers change their treatment of the group.
First, we construct the differential equation of the collective reputation variable Πt. Let φt denote the rate
of human capital acquisition among workers newly entering the market at time t. We assume that employers
have correct beliefs at each date about human capital acquisition within each population group. This implies
that the collective reputation variable Πit indicates the true skill investment rate of the group i population in
the temporary job market. Now, consider a very short time interval, from t to t + ∆t. Suppose that at the
beginning of the interval, a randomly chosen fraction (λ∆t + η∆t − λη∆t2) of the group’s population in the
temporary job market (N in) moves out of the market either by “dying” or through revelation of workers’ true
capabilities, as discussed in section 3.1. At the same time, a fraction λ∆t of the group’s total population (N i)
is newly born. At the end of the interval, the newborn agents incur the cost of skill achievement and enter the
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temporary job market. The total number of skilled workers in the temporary job market at time t + ∆t will
be the sum of skilled workers in the surviving population and those in the newborn cohort. Thus, the total
number of skilled workers belonging to group i in the temporary job market at time t + ∆t, N in · Πit+∆t, is
approximated as
N in ·Πit+∆t ≈ (N in− “outflow” in ∆t)×Πit + (“inflow” in ∆t)× φit
≈ (1− λ∆t− η∆t+ λη∆t2)N in ·Πit +N iλ∆t · φt. (8)
Rearranging, we have
∆Πit
∆t
≡ Π
i
t+∆t −Πit
∆t
≈ −(λ+ η)Πit +
λ
n
· φit + λη∆t ·Πit.
Taking the limit as ∆t→ 0 and using equation (1), we can express how Πit evolves over time for each population
group in the temporary labor market:
Π˙it = λ
′[φit −Πit], in which λ′ ≡ λ+ η. (9)
The differential equation indicates that Π˙it > 0 when φ
i
t > Π
i
t: if the fraction of newborn agents who invest in
skill (φit) is greater than the current collective reputation level in the temporary job market (Π
i
t), the group’s
reputation improves at time t. It does not change when the two terms are equal; otherwise, it declines. The
speed of group reputational change is also determined by the difference between the two terms, (|φit −Πit|) and
the rate at which the population is replaced in the market (λ′).
Because the group’s collective reputation improves from Πl to Π∗ given φit = Πh over the time span [0, T ],
we can calculate the time T , applying the above differential equation (9):
T =
1
λ′
· ln
(
Πh −Πl
Πh −Π∗
)
. (10)
Applying time T thus calculated to Lemma 2 directly, we obtain the following conclusive result:
Proposition 1 (Recovery Path). The conjectured dynamic recovery from a poor initial collective reputation Πl
is not possible when the initial skill level of the group is sufficiently low that it satisfies
Πl < Πh − (Πh −Π∗)
(
ωPu − ωPq
(δ + λ′)cm − ωPq − ω′
) λ′
δ+λ′
. (11)
The proposition implies that a group with a poor collective reputation may be unable to recover its reputation
through the coordinated expectations of group members because current newborns may not find that conjectured
future benefits can compensate for the necessary human capital acquisition costs.
Additionally, although a group’s initial collective reputation Πl may not be especially poor, the group may
be trapped in a low reputation equilibrium if group members weight too heavily the near future or are strongly
myopic. Thus, from the above proposition, we obtain the following equivalent result, given the two reputational
equilibria, Πh and Πl:
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Corollary 1. If the group members’ time discount rate δ is sufficiently high that it satisfies the following
condition, the conjectured dynamic recovery from the poor initial collective reputation Πl is not possible:
δ
λ′
>
ln(ωPu − ωPq)− ln((δ + λ′)cm − ωPq − ω′)
ln(Πh −Πl)− ln(Πh −Π∗) − 1. (12)
4 Dynamic System with a Collective Reputation
Whether the recovery path is available for a group with an arbitrary initial reputation can be examined using
a formal dynamic system with two differential equations: one for the collective reputation variable Πt, which
is constructed above in equation (9), and one for the expected net return variable R({ξeτ}∞t ). For convenience,
multiplying the net return displayed in equation (4) by the sum of the discounting factors, δ+λ+ η (= δ+λ′),
we denote as V et the “normalized” expected net return from investing in human capital acquisition:
V et = (δ + λ
′)
∫ ∞
t
[βτ (ξeτ ) · e−(δ+λ
′)(τ−t)]dτ + ω′. (13)
Taking the derivative of this expression with respect to t, the following differential equation, which describes
how the anticipated discounted net return V et evolves over time when group members share the same future
expectations regarding employers’ behavior {ξeτ}∞t , must obtain:
V˙ et = (δ + λ
′)[V et − βt(ξt)− ω′]. (14)
The differential equation indicates that V˙ et > 0 when βt(ξt) < V
e
t − ω′: if the currently accrued net return
to skill investment in the temporary job market (βt(ξt)) is smaller than a normalized level of the discounted
net return from the temporary job market (i.e., the normalized “total” discounted net return (V et ) minus the
normalized discounted net return from the “permanent” job market (ω′)), then the total discounted net return
expected to accrue between time t+∆t and death (V et+∆t) would exceed its current level: V
e
t+∆t > V
e
t .
For each population group that shares a common collective reputation, the evolution rule of the skill invest-
ment rate in the temporary job market, Π˙it, and that of the expected net return to human capital acquisition,
V˙ et , are displayed in the following theorem, where Πt is a flow variable and V
e
t is a jumping variable. The group
skill level Πt in the temporary job market is constantly adjusted by the skill investment rate of the newborn
cohort (φt), implying that Πt is a flow variable that cannot suddenly jump at some moment in time. However,
the net return to human capital acquisition V et depends on expectations regarding employers’ assignment be-
haviors in the future. Through an alteration of the expectation of {ξeτ}∞t , V et can make a sudden jump at any
point in time.
Theorem 1 (Dynamic System). The dynamic system with the flow variable Πt and the jumping variable V et is
summarized by the following two-variable differential equations:
Π˙t = λ′[φt −Πt]
V˙ et = (δ + λ
′)[V et − βt(ξt)− ω′],
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where φt is a function of V et , as φt = G(
V et
δ+λ′ ), and βt(ξt) is a function of Πt, as ξt = 1 for Πt ≥ Π∗, while
ξt = 0 for Πt < Π∗, with λ′ ≡ λ + η and ω′ ≡ ηωδ+λ . The two isoclines of the time dependent variables are
represented by
Π˙t = 0 Locus : Πt = φt
V˙ et = 0 Locus : V
e
t = βt(ξt) + ω
′.
The two isolines and the direction arrows are displayed in Figure 1. The first isocline is determined by the
newborns’ skill investment rate φt, which equals G(
V et
δ+λ′ ) so that the Π˙t = 0 locus is represented by Πt = Πl
for any V et ∈ [(δ+λ′)², (δ+λ′)cm) and by Πt = Πh for any V et ∈ [(δ+λ′)cm, (δ+λ′)K], where ² is close to zero
and K is a very large number. Above (below) the Π˙t = 0 locus, the movement of Πt is southward (northward).
The second isocline is determined by the currently accrued net return to skill investment in the temporary job
market (βt(ξt)) plus the normalized discounted net return in the permanent job market (ω′). Using equation
(2), the V˙ et = 0 locus is represented by V et = ωPq + ω
′ for any Πt ∈ [0,Π∗) and by V et = ωPu + ω′ for any
Πt ∈ [Π∗, 1]. To the left (right) of the V˙ et = 0 locus, the movement of V et is westward (eastward).
4.1 Equilibrium Paths Leading to Steady States
Under Lemma 1, the dynamic system has two steady states, (ωPq + ω′, Πl) and (ωPu + ω′, Πh), denoted by
Ql and Qh, respectively. First, consider the low reputation steady state, Ql. Given a low initial collective
reputation Πl of one’s identity group, the normalized net return to human capital acquisition is ωPq + ω′ in
so far as current and subsequent newborns hold the pessimistic expectation that employers will withhold the
benefit of the doubt forever (ξeτ = 0,∀τ ≥ 0). As newborns’ skill investment rate will continue to be as low as
Πl, with pessimism spread across the different time cohorts, employers never accord the benefit of the doubt
and the newborns’ earlier expectations regarding employers’ unfavorable future behavior are self-confirmed.
However, there is another possibility in the low reputation state, Ql. If newborns hold the optimistic
expectation that employers will change their behavior within a finite period of time (ξeτ = 1, ∀τ ≥ T, while ξeτ =
0,∀τ < T ), then the normalized net return to human capital acquisition may exceed (δ + λ′)cm. In this case,
newborns increase their skill investment rate up to Πh. In so far as subsequent newborns maintain the optimistic
expectation, the group’s collective reputation improves overtime, and eventually employers will start to accord
group members the benefit of the doubt when Πit ≥ Π∗. Thus, newborns’ earlier optimistic expectations
regarding employers’ favorable treatment in the future are self-confirmed.
Both possibilities are well depicted in Panel A of Figure 2, which shows two equilibrium paths: a pessimistic
path leading to a low reputation steady state Ql and an optimistic path leading to a high reputation steady
state Qh. Given a group’s initial low reputation Πl, whether the group’s reputation can recover depends on
group members’ coordinated expectations regarding the future (i.e. whether the group in state Ql “takes” the
optimistic path in the phase diagram).
Next, consider a high reputation steady state Qh. Given the high initial collective reputation Πh of a
group, the normalized net return to human capital acquisition is ωPu + ω′ in so far as current and subsequent
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newborns optimistically expect that employers will continue to accord group members the benefit of the doubt
forever (ξeτ = 1,∀τ ≥ 0). Because the net return exceeds the medium cost level, ωPu + ω′ > (δ + λ′)cm,
the skill investment rates of newborn cohorts are Πh. Then, the newborns’ earlier optimistic expectations are
self-confirmed by employers’ continuing favorable treatment of the group in the future.
However, we cannot rule out another possibility, namely, that current and subsequent newborns pessimisti-
cally expect that employers will stop giving group members the benefit of the doubt at some point in the future
(ξeτ = 0, ∀τ ≥ T ′, while ξeτ = 1, ∀τ < T ′). Then, the normalized net return to human capital acquisition may
fall below (δ + λ′)cm, as depicted in Panel A of the figure. In this case, newborns decrease their skill invest-
ment rate to Πl. As subsequent newborns maintain the same pessimism into the future, the group’s collective
reputation deteriorates overtime, and eventually, when Πit < Π∗, employers cease according group members the
benefit of the doubt. The reputation of the group will gradually fall to a low level Πl. Therefore, given the
initial high reputation Πh of a group, whether the group’s high reputation can be sustained also depends on
group members’ coordinated expectations regarding the future (i.e. whether the group in state Qh “takes” the
pessimistic path in the phase diagram).
4.2 Feasibility of Dynamic Recovery Path
Our primary interest is in characterizing the circumstances under which a reputational recovery to the state Qh
can occur in the given dynamic model of statistical discrimination. In fact, we can imagine many situations in
which the recovery is not feasible. For example, with greater δ, the speed of the expected net return change |V˙ et |
is also greater, and consequently, the dynamic equilibrium paths in the given phase diagram become “flatter.”
Then the dynamic reputational recovery path may not be feasible for an identity group, given a collective
reputation of Πl, as depicted in Panel B of Figure 2.
In the analysis below, we denote the lowest reputation level at which the optimistic equilibrium path leading
to Qh passes the vertical line V et = (δ+λ′)cm by pio. Along the optimistic path, a group’s state ((δ+λ′)cm, pio)
moves to state (ωPu + ω′, Π∗), given the high skill investment rate of the newborn cohorts of (φt = Πh, ∀t ∈
[0, T ]), while the benefit of the doubt is withheld by employers (βt(0) = ωPq, ∀t ∈ [0, T ]). In symmetric fashion,
we denote the highest reputation level at which the pessimistic equilibrium path leading to Ql passes the
vertical line V et = (δ+ λ′)cm by pip. Along the pessimistic path, a group’s state ((δ+ λ′)cm, pip) moves to state
(ωPq + ω′, Π∗), given the low skill investment rate of newborns (φt = Πl,∀t ∈ [0, T ′]), while employers accord
group members the benefit of the doubt (βt(1) = ωPu,∀t ∈ [0, T ′]). Using the given dynamic system, pio and
pip are directly computed from the following equations:
pio :
∫ Π∗
pio
dΠ
λ′(Πh −Π) =
∫ ωPu+ω′
(δ+λ′)cm
dV e
(δ + λ′)(V e − ωPq − ω′) (15)
pip :
∫ Π∗
pip
dΠ
λ′(Πl −Π) =
∫ ωPq+ω′
(δ+λ′)cm
dV e
(δ + λ′)(V e − ωPu − ω′) (16)
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Therefore, we obtain the following result:
pio = Πh + (Π∗ −Πh) · v∗−
λ′
δ+λ′ , (17)
pip = Πl + (Π∗ −Πl) · (1− v∗)−
λ′
δ+λ′ , (18)
where we define v∗ ≡ (δ+λ′)cm−ωPq−ω′ωPu−ωPq (< 1). Note that pio (pip) increases (decreases) with the time discount
factor δ: ∂pi
o
∂δ > 0 and
∂pip
∂δ < 0.
For the dynamic recovery path to be feasible for the poor reputation group in state Ql, pio should not be
greater than Πl: pio ≤ Πl, as depicted in Panel A of Figure 2. If pio > Πl, as depicted in Panel B of the figure,
dynamic recovery is unobtainable for the group because the discounted net return from the optimistic scenario
that employers change their behaviors within a finite period of time cannot exceed the incurred medium cost
level cm. This implies that if the initial skill level of a group in the low reputation equilibrium (Πl) is sufficiently
low that it is even less than the critical level pio, or if group members are myopic, placing too much weight on
the near future (that is, their time discount factor δ is sufficiently large), then pio becomes greater than Πl, and
consequently, the dynamic reputation recovery path is not feasible for the poor reputation group in state Ql. It
can easily be checked that these results are equivalent to those summarized in Proposition 1 and Corollary 1:
Proposition 2 (Recovery Path). Under the dynamic system stated in Theorem 1, the dynamic reputation
recovery path is not feasible for group members whose collective reputation is the low equilibrium reputation Πl
when the following condition holds, which is equivalent to the conditions provided in Proposition 1 and Corollary
1:
Πl < pio
(
= Πh + (Π∗ −Πh) · v∗−
λ′
δ+λ′
)
.
4.3 Overlap and Reputation Trap
In this section, we extend our analysis and examine possible paths from an arbitrary initial reputation of group
i, Πi0 ∈ [0, 1]. First, consider the case where a group’s initial reputation is below the BOD standard Π∗:
Πi0 < Π
∗. One possibility is that group members expect employers to continue to withhold the benefit of the
doubt forever: ξet = 0, ∀t ≥ 0. Then the normalized expected net return V et is fixed at ωPq + ω′ for all t ≥ 0,
a level that is below (δ + λ′)cm. Because newborn workers will invest at the rate Πl, the group’s collective
reputation converges to the low steady state level Πl as t→∞. This possibility is described by the pessimistic
path in Figure 2.
Another possibility is that newborns expect that while the group is being denied the benefit of the doubt
today, it may yet be extended to group members at some future time T : ξet = 1, ∀t ≥ T . If the anticipated date
at which employer’s behavior will shift is not too distant, then newborns may wish to acquire human capital at
a higher rate Πh: φ0 = Πh if V e0 > (δ + λ
′)cm. Provided that subsequent newborn workers do not alter these
optimistic expectations, the higher skill investment rate will continue, and the group’s reputation will improve
overtime, eventually converging to Π∗ at time T , when employers indeed begin to accord group members the
benefit of the doubt. This possibility is described by the optimistic path in Figure 2. It is notable that given
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that pio > Πl, coordinated optimistic expectations may not be feasible when the group’s initial reputation level
is below the critical level pio: Πi0 < pi
o, as depicted in Panel B of the figure.
Second, consider the case where the group’s initial reputation is above the BOD standard Π∗: Πi0 ≥ Π∗.
Again, one possibility is that group members believe that the employers will continue to accord them the benefit
of the doubt forever: ξeτ = 1, ∀τ ≥ 0. Because the normalized expected net return V et is fixed at ωPu + ω′ for
all t ≥ 0, a level that is above (δ + λ′)cm, newborn workers invest at the rate Πh, and the group’s reputation
converges to Πh as t → ∞. This possibility is also described by the optimistic path in Figure 2. There exists
another possibility, however, namely, that newborns expect that while the group is receiving the benefit of the
doubt today, employers will stop giving it at some point in the future T ′: ξeτ = 0, ∀τ ≥ T ′. If the anticipated date
at which employers’ behavior is to shift is not very distant, then newborns with a medium cost of skill investment
may not wish to acquire human capital today: φ0 = Πl if V e0 < (δ + λ
′)cm. Provided that newborn workers do
not alter these pessimistic expectations, the group’s reputation will deteriorate overtime and converge to Π∗ at
time T ′, when employers indeed change their treatment of the group. This possibility is also described by the
pessimistic path in Figure 2. It is also notable that given that pip < Πh, coordinated pessimistic expectations
may not be feasible when the group’s initial reputation is sufficiently strong that Πi0 > pi
p, as depicted in Panel
B of the figure.
Thus far, we have described two self-confirming equilibrium paths: an optimistic (pessimistic) path along
which all group members are well coordinated in their optimism (pessimism) and where the optimistic (pes-
simistic) result is self-confirmed in the future. Nonetheless, we cannot rule out other possible paths that are
not “self-confirming.” For example, some fraction (α) of every cohort may be optimistic, while others (1 − α)
are pessimistic when both scenarios seem plausible, where the final state, either high or low equilibrium steady
state, depends on the relative size of the optimistic fraction of the group, determined by the parameter α.
Although there may exist many different combinations worthy of consideration, the feasibility of the dynamic
recovery path to high equilibrium steady state (or that of the dynamic “deteriorating” path to low equilibrium
steady state) is exclusively confined to some range of a group’s current reputation level, Πi0.
For example, as discussed above, given that pio > Πl, the dynamic recovery path is never feasible if the
initial reputation level is so poor that it is less than pio: that is, even if optimism is ready to be fully shared
among all group members (α = 1), newborns will not invest at the high rate Πh because the anticipated date of
employers’ behavioral change toward favorable treatment is too distant, implying that the reputation recovery
never happen. Similarly, given that pip < Πh, the group’s reputation will never deteriorate to the low equilibrium
reputation state if the current reputation level is sufficiently strong that Πi0 > pi
p: that is, even if pessimism is
ready to be shared among all group members (α = 0), newborns who know the anticipated date of employers’
change of treatment is too distant will invest at the high rate Πh and a deterioration in reputation is not
possible. This feasibility discussion is summarized, using the term “overlap”, borrowed from Krugman(1991):
Definition 1 (Overlap). A range of a group’s reputation level is called “overlap”. If the group’s initial reputation
Πi0 is within the overlap, then the group’s collective reputation can converge either to the high equilibrium
reputation state, if an optimistic view is shared among group members, or to the low equilibrium reputation
state, if a pessimistic view is shared among group members. On the other hand, if a group’s current reputation
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level is below (above) the overlap, the dynamic recovery (deteriorating) path is not feasible.
That is, outside the overlap, there exists a unique equilibrium path either to Qh or to Ql so that a group’s
final state cannot be altered by the choice of coordinated expectations among group members. The boundary
of overlap is characterized by the following property, as contrasted in Panels A and B in Figure 2:
Lemma 3. The lower boundary of overlap is pio when pio > Πl and is zero otherwise. The upper boundary of
overlap is pip when pip < Πh and is one otherwise.
Using the above lemma, we directly obtain the following result regarding the size of overlap.
Proposition 3. In the simple dynamic model of statistical discrimination, the overlap is [pio, pip] when both
pio > Πl and pip < Πh are satisfied, while it is the entire range of group reputation level [0, 1] when both pio ≤ Πl
and pip ≥ Πh are satisfied.
We now define another term, “reputation trap,” whereby a group is trapped with its low initial collective
reputation and cannot recover its reputation in the absence of external intervention:
Definition 2. A range of a group’s reputation level is called a “reputation trap”. If the group’s initial reputation
Πi0 falls within the reputation trap, the group’s reputation cannot be recovered even through collective optimism
among group members about the future.
Using the definition of overlap, the reputation trap is simply the range below overlap. According to Lemma
3, the existence of a reputation trap is guaranteed by Πl < pio, as summarized in the following Theorem. It
is notable that the condition is also equivalent to those in Propositions 1 and 2. Any group with the low
equilibrium reputation Πl is trapped by the negative influence of reputational externalities when a reputation
trap [0, pio) exists.
Theorem 2. Under Lemmas 1 and 3, if the following condition holds, there exists a reputation trap [0, pio) within
which a group’s collective reputation cannot be recovered through group members’ coordinated expectations about
the future. Also, the low equilibrium reputation Πl falls within this trap:
Πl < pio ⇐⇒
(
Πh −Π∗
Πh −Πl
)
< v∗
λ′
δ+λ′ , where v∗ ≡ (δ + λ
′)cm − ωPq − ω′
ωPu − ωPq . (19)
This theorem suggests one possible source of persistent disparities between racial groups. For example,
during the Jim Crow period and until the civil rights movement in the 1960s, African-Americans were overtly
discriminated against in the US labor market. Although such discrimination has decreased significantly in
recent decades, we continue to observe persistent black-white disparities in skill achievement. According to the
theorem, when overt discrimination in American history results in a very low ratio of qualified workers among
blacks, the black population may become stuck in a “reputation trap” and suffer from continuing “statistical”
discrimination practices in the labor market. Any collective action through coordinated expectations regarding
the future would be ineffective in this situation. Rational agents may not invest in skills when it is unlikely that
their skill achievement will be properly compensated in the foreseeable future.
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5 Further Discussion
In the dynamic model presented, we have adopted the simplest signal functions of uniformly distributed fu(θ)
and fq(θ) and a simple cost distribution function G(c) with three types of agents: high, low and medium
cost individuals. This simplification aids an intuitive understanding of the essential structure of reputational
dynamics. Avoiding massive complications, we can derive clean and transparent theoretical results. However,
some readers may be uncomfortable with a simple set-up in which employers decide only whether to accord
workers the benefit of the doubt when the signal is unclear so that the hiring standard is chosen among only two
specific signals, θu or θq. Moreover, assuming three types of agents, the skill investment decision of a medium
cost population exclusively affects the evolution of a group’s collective reputation. To mitigate such concerns,
the Appendix presents a generalized dynamic model and shows that the major findings can be replicated without
the above simplifications.3
Furthermore, in the proposed model, we adopt continuous time functions to make the dynamic model easily
tractable. Owing to the continuity of the time functions, workers are rematched (or newly contracted) with
employers in each instant in the temporary job market. Readers will find that the major results of this paper
are also derived using discrete-time functions, where worker are rematched every period instead of every instant.
In the following discussion, we further examine the properties of the dynamic equilibrium paths identified
earlier and provide the policy implications that can be derived from the dynamics of statistical discrimination.
Readers eager to learn about the policy implications may skip the next section without loss of continuity.
5.1 Properties of Dynamic Equilibrium Paths
The shape of the self-confirming dynamic equilibrium path to the high reputation steady state Qh is manifest
in the phase diagram when 0 < pio ≤ Πl, as displayed in Panel A of Figure 2. As we examine the slope Π˙tV˙ et , we
directly observe that the equilibrium path is composed of two concave parts in the region below the horizontal
line representing Πt = Π∗. Symmetrically, the shape of the dynamic equilibrium path to the low reputation
steady states Ql is also manifest when Πh ≤ pip < 1, as displayed in the same panel. The equilibrium path is
composed of two convex parts in the region above the horizontal line Πt = Π∗, as the slope Π˙tV˙ et
changes along
the path.
The shapes of the dynamic equilibrium paths are more complex when either pio > Πl or pip < Πh. For
example, the specific case in which both conditions obtain is depicted in Panel B of Figure 2, where the overlap
is [pio, pip], in accordance with Proposition 3. In terms of the shapes and curvatures of the dynamic equilibrium
paths leading to the two steady states, we obtain the following two major results:
Proposition 4 (Spiraling Paths). Given pio > Πl, the optimistic equilibrium path leading to the high reputation
steady state Qh spirals out around the central state ((δ+λ′)cm,Π∗). Given pip < Πh, the pessimistic equilibrium
path leading to the low reputation steady state Ql also spirals out around the same state.
Proof. See the proof in the appendix. ¥
3In addition, unlike under the simplified set-up, the net benefit of investing in skills in the generalized model can be either
increasing or decreasing in a firm’s prior beliefs, as in Coate and Loury’s (1993) original work.
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The proposition implies that whenpio > Πl (pip < Πh), the spiraling optimistic (pessimistic) equilibrium path
originates from the central state ((δ + λ′)cm,Π∗). In addition, the following corollary explains its curvature.
Corollary 2 (Curvature of Paths). Given pio > Πl, the spiraling optimistic equilibrium path leading to the high
reputation steady state Qh is concave on the right-hand side of the V et = (δ + λ
′)cm line and convex on the
left-hand side of the V et = (δ+λ
′)cm line. The same is true of the spiraling pessimistic equilibrium path leading
to the low reputation steady state Ql, given pip < Πh.
Proof. See the proof in the appendix. ¥
5.2 Policy Interventions from a Dynamic Perspective
In the given dynamic structure, the steady state Qh strictly Pareto dominates the steady state Ql in that all
economic agents, including employers and workers with different investment costs, are better off when the group
state (vet ,Πt) remains at the steady state Qh rather than at the steady state Ql, as summarized in the following
corollary:
Corollary 3 (Pareto Dominance). In the proposed dynamic reputation model, the steady state Qh strictly
Pareto dominates the steady state Ql.
Proof. See the proof in the appendix. ¥
Pareto dominance implies that groups in the high reputation state Qh are socially more desirable than those
in the low reputation state Ql. As more group members invest in skill, additional accumulated benefits are
distributed among all economic agents.4 In this respect, government intervention to mobilize a disadvantaged
group out of the low reputation steady state is needed to improve social outcomes.
Imagine an identity group that remains at the low reputation steady state Ql. If the current reputation
level Πl is already in the overlap range, as in Panel A in Figure 2, then the economic performance of the
group can be improved simply by increasing its expectations of a brighter future. Collective action to manage
expectations may occasion significant behavioral change among young members of the disadvantaged group.
The direct government intervention would not be needed to impact the group’s skill level, in this case. Instead,
an emphasis on coordinated optimism could be pursued. The decisive role of collective optimism is often ignored
in contemporary policy debates. Not only the government but also civic organizations and religious groups may
seek to encourage shared optimism among the group members.
However, if the current reputation level is far below the overlap, as in Panel B in Figure 2, the group may
be trapped by the negative influence of reputational externalities, and an active state role will be needed to
enable the group’s collective reputation to enter the overlap range. Temporary affirmative action measures can
be employed, however, which enhance the group’s skill level to the point that it enters the overlap range, after
4Pareto dominance may not characterize thejob assignment framework introduced by Coate and Loury(1993), when production
complementarities between high and low skilled workers and competitive rather than exogenous wages are considered (Moro and
Norman, 2004). For example, the wages of agents with low investment costs may decline as more group members obtain skills.
Skilled workers can be negatively affected by increased skill investment of other workers.
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which private optimism-promoting efforts can achieve the group’s transition to the high-reputation steady state.
In the following discussion, we examine two policies that the government may implement to make the dynamic
reputation recovery path feasible for a disadvantaged group whose current reputation level Πl is below the lower
boundary of the overlap pio: 1) cost reduction through training subsidies; and 2) favorable hiring standards.
The patronizing policy intervention, discussed in Coate and Loury(1993), is also examined in the given dynamic
context.
5.2.1 Cost Reduction through Subsidy
The most direct form of government intervention is to support the training costs of disadvantaged group mem-
bers. As discussed in section 3.4, if and only if the expected return to human capital acquisition R({ξeτ}∞0 )
in equation (6) is no less than the cost, current newborns start to invest in skills, given the time T at which
employers are conjectured to shift their treatment of the group so that ξet = 0 for t < T and ξ
e
t = 1 for t ≥ T .
As the government implements the training subsidy program, the cost level of the medium ability newborns
(cm) can be reduced up to the conjectured return level R({ξeτ}∞0 ) accrued in the reputation recovery scenario.
Combining equations (6) and (10), we can compute the target cost level c˜m directly, such that medium ability
newborns are induced to start investing in skills:5
c˜m =
1
δ + λ′
ωPq + ω′ + (ωPu − ωPq)
(
Πh −Π∗
Πh −Πl
) δ+λ′
λ′
 . (20)
The subsidy(S) must at least equal the difference between the target cost level c˜m and the original cost level
cm: S ≡ cm− c˜m. The subsidy program is described in Panel A of Figure 3. Given the government subsidy, the
“normalized” cost distribution G(c) shifts to the left by the amount of the subsidy S times the normalization
factor (δ+λ′), rendering the optimistic equilibrium path feasible for the disadvantaged group in the reputation
trap.
The model implies that to escape the low investment trap, a subsidy intervention that lowers investment
costs of the disadvantaged group must be sufficiently large. At the same time, an emphasis on coordinated
optimism should be pursued, as young members of the group will not alter their behavior even with the lowered
investment cost if they continue to take a pessimistic view of the group’s future. It is also notable that in
the dynamic perspective considered, the subsidy program need not be long-standing. Assuming that optimism
about the future is sustained, the subsidy can be withdrawn as soon as the group’s collective reputation exceeds
the lower boundary of the overlap pio, and thus enters the overlap range.
5.2.2 Favorable Hiring Standard
Given the uniformly distributed signal functions cited above, employers impose the stricter hiring standard θu on
job candidates from the disadvantaged group. As the government intervenes with the objective of elevating the
5The target cost level ˜cm can also be derived from the differential equations in Theorem 1. Once the target cost level is matched
by the government, the group’s reputation can recover, with its state moving from state ((δ + λ′) ˜cm,Πl) to state (ωPu + ω′,Π∗)
in the phase diagram along the optimistic equilibrium path. Thus, the target cost level ˜cm must satisfy the following condition:∫ ωPu+ω′
(δ+λ′) ˜cm
dVt
(δ+λ′)(Vt−ωPq−ω′) =
∫ Π∗
Πl
dΠt
λ′(Πh−Πt) (≡ T ).
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group to the socially desirable state Qh, employers may reduce the hiring standard imposed on group members.
The degree of affirmative action regulation can be measured by the newly introduced hiring standard θ˜(< θu) of
employers. We assume that employers impose the favorable hiring standard θ˜ as long as the group’s collective
reputation (belief about the average productivity of its members) remains below the threshold level Π∗.
Let us denote the expected return from investing in human capital accrued at time τ in the temporary
job market by βτ (θ˜), where θ˜ indicates the policy-induced hiring standard. Suppose that workers from the
disadvantaged group speculate that the favorable hiring standard θ˜ will continue from the present until time T ,
at which the group’s collective reputation is expected to have attained the threshold level Π∗, so that employers
start to accord group members the benefit of the doubt. Replacing βτ (0)(= ωPq) with βτ (θ˜) in equation (6),
we obtain the return to human capital acquisition for a newborn worker of the group:
R(θ˜) =
1
δ + λ′
{
βτ (θ˜) + ω′ + (ωPu − βτ (θ˜))e−(δ+λ′)T
}
. (21)
Only when R(θ˜) ≥ cm will newborn workers start to invest at the high rate Πh. Using the time span T
determined by equation (10), we obtain the following lemma:
Lemma 4. The favorable hiring standard θ˜(< θu) imposed by employers can lead to reputational recovery of
the disadvantaged group, provided that the expected return from investing in human capital accrued at time τ in
the temporary job market, βτ (θ˜), is not less than βˆ, given by6
βˆ ≡ (δ + λ
′)cm − ω′ − ωPu · e−(δ+λ′)T
1− e−(δ+λ′)T , with T =
1
λ′
· ln
(
Πh −Πl
Πh −Π∗
)
. (22)
The dynamic recovery path with the critical return level of βˆ is depicted in Panel B of Figure 3. As
the return from investing in human capital accrued at time τ (βτ ) increases, owing to the introduction of
affirmative action, V˙ et (= (δ+λ
′)[V et −βt−ω′]) becomes smaller, and consequently, the direction arrows become
steeper. This structural change makes the dynamic optimistic path feasible for the group trapped at the low
reputation level Πl. From the dynamic structure, we can also infer that the critical return level βˆ satisfies
ωPq < βˆ < (δ + λ′)cm − ω′.
First, imagine that employers impose the favorable hiring standard θ˜ within the range (θq, θu). Given the
uniformly distributed signal functions, the expected net return from investment accrued at time τ , βτ (θ˜), is the
return from investment
(
θ¯−θ˜
θ¯−θq · ω
)
minus the return from non-investment
(
θu−θ˜
θu
· ω
)
:
βτ (θ˜) =
θqθu − (θq + θu − θ¯)θ˜
(θ¯ − θq)θu
· w, for θ˜ ∈ (θq, θu). (23)
Note that βτ (θ˜) is a decreasing function of θ˜ ∈ (θq, θu), as we assume that Pq < Pu or, equivalently, that
θq + θu > θ¯, in section 3.2. Therefore, the disadvantaged group can recover its reputation through collective
6The critical level βˆ is also derived from the differential equations in Theorem 1. Once the time τ return from skill investment
(βτ ) is enhanced, owing to the affirmative action program, the group’s reputation can recover, with its state moving from state
((δ+ λ′)cm,Πl) to state (ωPu +ω′,Π∗) in the phase diagram along the optimistic equilibrium path. Thus, the critical return level
βˆ must satisfy the following condition:
∫ ωPu+ω′
(δ+λ′)cm
dVt
(δ+λ′)(Vt−βˆ−ω′)
=
∫ Π∗
Πl
dΠt
λ′(Πh−Πt) (≡ T ).
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optimism, provided the hiring standard θ˜ is lowered sufficiently that it is below some threshold level θ˜′:
βτ (θ˜) ≥ βˆ, given θ˜ ∈ (θq, θu) ⇐⇒ θ˜ ≤ θqθuω − (θ¯ − θq)θuβˆ(θq + θu − θ¯)ω
(≡ θ˜′), (24)
where the existence of θ˜′ is guaranteed by βτ (θu)(≡ ωPq) < βˆ < βτ (θq)(≡ ωPu).
However, imagine that the degree of affirmative action is very strong and that the imposed hiring standard
is below θq: θ˜ ∈ (0, θq). That is, the policy-induced hiring standard imposed on the disadvantaged group is even
more favorable than that imposed on the advantaged group (θq) with a high reputation level Πh. In this case,
the expected net return from investment accrued at time τ (βτ ) is βτ (θ˜) = ω − θu−θ˜θu · w, which is equivalent
to θ˜θu · w, givenθ˜ ∈ (0, θq). This implies that the lower is the hiring standard, the less is the expected net
return accrued in the future. That is, the incentive for the skill achievement is lowered with the more favorable
treatment in the labor market. Surprisingly, the dynamic recovery path would then not be feasible for the
disadvantaged group members if the hiring standard θ˜ is lowered so much that it is even below some threshold
level θ˜′′:
βτ (θ˜) < βˆ, given θ˜ ∈ (0, θq) ⇐⇒ θ˜ < θuβˆ
ω
(≡ θ˜′′), (25)
where the existence of θ˜′′ is guaranteed by βτ (0)(≡ 0) < βˆ < βτ (θq)(≡ ωPu). This can be called a “patronizing”
government intervention: under an excessive affirmative action program, group members are discouraged from
enhancing their human capital acquisition. The following proposition summarizes the above discussion:
Proposition 5. A government intervention, by lowering the hiring standard of employers, can render the
reputation recovery path feasible for a disadvantaged group trapped at the low reputation level Πl(< pio), provided
that the policy-induced hiring standard satisfies the following condition: θ˜′′ ≤ θ˜ ≤ θ˜′. However, an excessive
government intervention, where the induced hiring standard θ˜ falls below θ˜′′, may generate the patronizing policy
outcome, failing to pull the group out of the trap.
Therefore, there are circumstances under which affirmative action will necessarily eliminate negative stereo-
types, while there are equally plausible circumstances under which it will fail to do so, undercutting workers’
incentives to acquire necessary skills. This possibly perverse effect of affirmative action was also highlighted in a
static framework by Coate and Loury (1993), who analyzed how affirmative action in the form of an employment
quota may affect incentives to invest in skills. In so-called “patronizing equilibria,” incentives to invest in skills
may be reduced in the static equilibrium with affirmative action relative to that without affirmative action.
We can now confirm this possibility of “patronizing” quota policy in the dynamic framework considered
here. For example, imagine that the government imposes a strict quota on hiring, requiring that members
of two identity groups, B and W , be hired at equal rates, where group B’s current reputation is Πl in the
reputation trap range, while group W ’s reputation is Πh. For simplicity, let us suppose that employers adjust
the hiring standard imposed on group B members while maintaining the hiring standard on group W members
at the lenient level θq. Then the target hiring standard of group B, denoted by θ˜∗, must satisfy the following
condition: Πl + (1−Πl)(1− θ˜∗/θu) = Πh+ (1−Πh)(1− θq/θu) so that θ˜∗ = 1−Πh1−Πl θq, which is within the range
(0, θq). Therefore, the strict quota policy might be patronizing, without altering the incentives of disadvantaged
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group members to invest in skills, if the quota-induced hiring standard (θ˜∗) falls below the threshold θ˜′′:
1−Πh
1−Πl θq <
θuβˆ
ω (≡ θ˜′′).
6 Conclusion
This paper adds a new twist to the highly developed literature on self-fulfilling reputation through an application
to racial discrimination (Arrow, 1973; Coate and Loury, 1993). Past studies have shown that multiple equilibria
may exist when poor group reputation reduces the value to group members of investment in human capital so
that a poor group reputation becomes self-fulfilling. The present paper adds a dynamic analysis of a somewhat
specialized model that shows how reputation can evolve from different starting points. When initial conditions
are not too extreme, if workers are sufficiently patient and if new workers replace old ones at a sufficiently rapid
rate, then self-confirming equilibrium paths to low and high steady states overlap, so that either path can be
attained, depending on the expectations of group members. If initial group reputations are too extreme (or
workers too impatient, or worker replacement takes place at too slow a rate), however, then the paths do not
overlap, and groups with a poor collective reputation will be stuck in a “reputation trap.” Thus, the dynamic
model shows that although between-group disparities may originate from a failure of expectation coordination,
in some circumstances, a group cannot escape a once-developed low skill investment trap, regardless of how the
expectations of its members are formed.
This approach affords new insights into the question of how policy can affect the equilibrium in which
the economy finally settles. If a disadvantaged group’s initial condition is within the overlap range, the direct
government intervention would not be needed to impact the group’s skill investment activities. Instead, collective
optimism among disadvantaged group members can be crucial to altering the behavior of group members,
although this fact is often ignored in policy debates. If the group’s initial condition is within the trap, however,
policies designed to mobilize the group out of the trap may include directly subsidizing human capital investment
and relaxing the hiring standards that face the group, policies that will help make the reputation recovery path
feasible for a group trapped in low skill investment activities. Nevertheless, an overly liberal relaxation of
standards may generate unintended patronizing outcomes by reducing skill investment incentives, a conclusion
that is consistent with the findings of Coate and Loury (1993).
Although we have discussed the importance of expectations in population-specific discriminatory dynamics,
we have not yet discussed how expectations about the future are formed when both optimistic and pessimistic
expectations are feasible. The mechanism of belief formation is an important topic but one that is beyond the
scope of this paper and thus is left for future research. Additionally, in our model, given the assumption that
wages are exogenously determined, inter-group interactions in the labor market are not fully examined. This
also provides an avenue for future research.
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7 Appendix A: Case with Generalized Functional Forms
In the earlier discussion, we have assumed the simplest signal functions where both fu(θ) and fq(θ) are uniformly
distributed, generating only three possible outcomes of the job market screening process: “pass,” “fail” and
“unclear” test results. The cost distribution G(c) is also assumed to be a step function that represents only
three types of agents: “low,” “intermediate” and “high” cost individuals. The simplified functional forms
aid comprehension of the key intuition and the essential feature of the proposed dynamic model. However,
some readers may wonder whether the major findings could be generated from other functional forms of signal
functions and cost distributions. Some may also question whether the findings may be attributable to the
artificial functional specifications. In this appendix, we address those concerns by showing that the major
findings in this paper can be obtained from generalized signal functions and a generalized cost distribution.
Let us define ψ(θ) ≡ fu(θ)/fq(θ) as the likelihood ratio at θ. We assume that ψ(θ) is nonincreasing on [0, θ¯],
which implies that Fq(θ) ≤ Fu(θ) for all θ. Employers’ assignment policies will be characterized by the choice
of hiring standard s for each group, such that only those workers whose observed signals exceeds the standard
are assigned to the more demanding task. Given the proportion of qualified workers Πi among the group i
population in the temporary job market, employers assign a group i worker who “emits” signal θ to Task One
if the expected payoff, xq · Prob[qualified|θ] − xu · Prob[unqualified|θ], is nonnegative. Using Bayes’ rule, the
posterior probability that he is qualified is Π
ifq(θ)
Πifq(θ)+(1−Πi)fu(θ) . Therefore, the hiring standard s is a function of
Πi, as suggested in Coate and Loury (1993):
s(Πi) ≡ min
{
θ ∈ [0, θ¯]
∣∣∣ψ(θ) ≤ ρΠi
1−Πi
}
, with ρ ≡ xq
xu
, (26)
where s(Πi) is a nonincreasing function of Πi. Note that s(0) ≤ θ¯ and s(1) = 0.
If the assignment standard is s, the probability of assignment to Task One is 1−Fq(s), when qualified, and
1−Fu(s), when unqualified. The expected net return to being qualified at time τ (βτ (seτ )) is ω[Fu(seτ )−Fq(seτ )],
which is hump-shaped, where ω is the wage rate for Task One. Then βt(ξt) is replaced by βt(st(Πt)) ≡ βt(Πt)
in the dynamic system summarized in Theorem 1. Additionally, note that βt(Πt) ≥ 0, given Πt = 0, while
βt(Πt) = 0, given Πt = 1.
The cost of becoming qualified varies among workers and is distributed as CDF G(c) in (0,∞). We assume
that G(0) > 0, which implies that a fraction of workers will invest for very small expected returns on their
investment. Suppose G(c) is S -shaped, so that its PDF g(a) has one peak (e.g., is bell-shaped). Given G(c),
the skill investment rate of the newborn cohort, φt, is φt = G(
V et
δ+λ′ ).
Therefore, the dynamic system is summarized by the following two-variable differential equations:
Π˙t = λ′[φt(V et )−Πt]
V˙ et = (δ + λ
′)[V et − βt(Πt)− ω′],
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where the two isoclines of the time dependent variables are represented by:
Π˙t = 0 Locus : Πt = φt(V et )
V˙ et = 0 Locus : V
e
t = βt(Πt) + ω
′.
The Π˙t = 0 locus is S-shaped, while the V˙ et = 0 locus is hump-shaped, as depicted in Appendix Figure 1.
Under the boundary conditions that φt(0) > 0 and βt(0) + ω′ ≥ 0, there must be at least one steady state. We
suppose that there exist only three steady states, which we denote by Qh(Vh,Πh), Qm(Vm,Πm) and Ql(Vl,Πl),
where Πh > Πm > Πl. Regarding the properties of these steady states, we obtain the following direct result.
Lemma 5 (Saddle Points). Among the three steady states (Qh, Qm and Ql), Qh and Ql are saddle points, and
Qm is a source.
Proof. See the proof in the appendix. ¥
The lemma implies that we can find unique saddle paths converging to high and low reputation steady states,
Qh and Ql. Although Qm is another steady state, no phase path converges to it because it is a source. First,
consider Panel A of the appendix figure, where the saddle path converging to the high reputation steady state
Qh is feasible for any initial reputation level of group i, Πi0. In this case, a group with a lower initial collective
reputation level may recover its reputation through coordinated optimistic expectations among group members
regarding employers’ behavior in the future: although they are unfavorably treated now and a high hiring
standard is imposed, employers will lower the standard in the future. Given the shared optimism, the expected
net return to human capital acquisition V e0 increases, and a greater fraction of the newborn cohort invests in
skills. As more of the group’s newborn workers acquire human capital, the group’s collective reputation improves
over time, and employers’ hiring standard is eventually lowered, self-confirming earlier optimistic expectations
regarding employers’ behavior.
However, this optimistic expectation coordination may not be feasible in some cases. Consider Panel B of
the same figure, where the saddle path converging to the high reputation steady state Qh is feasible only when
a group’s initial collective reputation is sufficiently strong. Note that the slope of a phase path at an arbitrary
state (V et ,Πt) is determined by
Π˙t
V˙ et
= λ
′[φt(V et )−Πt]
(δ+λ′)[V et −βt(Πt)−ω′] , according to the above dynamic system. The larger
is the time discount factor δ, the flatter is the phase path for a given state (V et ,Πt). If δ is sufficiently large, then
the converging path to the high reputation steady state may not reach the V et axis, as the path originates from
the source Qm. That is, we may be in the range of the reputation trap, that is, the range below the overlap. If
so, then the trap must cover the low equilibrium reputation Πl. Thus, a group at the low equilibrium state Ql
may be unable to recover its reputation in the absence of external intervention.
Furthermore, we obtain the following lemma regarding the phase paths near the source Qm:
Lemma 6 (Spiraling Out). There exists a critical level of (λ
′
δ )
∗, above which phase paths spiral out, and below
which they do not spiral out, in the neighborhood of Qm, where (λ
′
δ )
∗ satisfies
(
1 + λ
′
δ
)
λ′
δ =
1
4(φ′tβ
′
t−1)
∣∣
(Vm,Πm)
.
Proof. See the proof in the appendix. ¥
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This lemma provides a sufficient condition for the generation of spiraling converging paths to the steady
states, Qh and Ql, when the paths originate from the source Qm. In addition, the lemma shows that if the time
discount factor δ is very large, then the converging paths to Qh and Ql do not spiral out near their origin Qm.
This implies that the converging equilibrium paths may directly connect the origin Qm and the equilibrium
states, Qh and Ql, without a spiraling interval. In this extreme case, there is no overlap at all, and the size of
the reputation trap is maximized: the dynamic reputation recovery path is not feasible for any group with its
initial collective reputation below the intermediate level Πm.
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8 Appendix B: Proofs
8.1 Proof of Proposition 4
To examine the proposition more effectively, we focus on the limited range of V et ∈ [ωPq + ω′, ωPu + ω′] and
linearly transform V et so that V
e
t = ωPq + ω
′ + ω(Pu − Pq)vt. Now, vt ranges over [0, 1] as V et ranges over
[ωPq + ω′, ωPu + ω′]. Applying the function βτ (ξeτ ) in equation (2) to the definition of V
e
t in equation (13), the
function V et can be displayed as follows:
V et = ωPq + ω
′ + ω(Pu − Pq)
[
(δ + λ′)
∫ ∞
t
ξeτe
−(δ+λ′)(τ−t)dτ
]
. (27)
Therefore, the linear transformation of V et implies that vt indicates the normalized level of present discounted
lifetime BOD:
vt = (δ + λ′)
∫ ∞
t
ξeτe
−(δ+λ′)(τ−t)dτ. (28)
Using this equation for vt, both the differential equation V˙ et and its isocline(the V˙
e
t = 0 locus) in Theorem 1 are
replaced as follows: v˙t = (δ+ λ′)[vt − ξt] and its isocline, the v˙t = 0 locus, is vt = ξt, where ξt = 1 for Πt ≥ Π∗,
while ξt = 0 for Πt < Π∗. In this (vt,Πt) domain, the critical level of V et , (δ + λ
′)cm, is also transformed to
v∗ ≡ (δ+λ′)cm−ωPq−ω′ωPu−ωPq . The new phase diagram, with v∗, and the two corresponding steady states, Qh(1,Πh)
and Ql(0,Πl), is displayed in Panel A of Appendix Figure 2. For convenience, let us divide the (vt,Πt) domain
into four regions classified by two straight lines, vt = v∗ and Πt = Π∗, and name them regions I, II, III and IV,
going counterclockwise, as marked in the panel.
First, we prove that an arbitrary phase path around the state (v∗,Π∗) is spiraling. Assume an arbitrary
starting point a on the Πt = Π∗ line near state (v∗,Π∗): a(va,Π∗). The initial state at a moves counterclockwise,
according to the directional arrows depicted in Panel A of Appendix Figure 2. Suppose the path starting from
a passes across the v = v∗ line at b(v∗,Πb), the Πt = Π∗ line at c(vc,Π∗), the vt = v∗ line at d(v∗,Πd) and
the Πt = Π∗ line at a′(va′ ,Π∗), as described in the same panel. In region I, the slope of the phase path is
represented by v˙t
Π˙t
= (δ+λ
′)(vt−1)
λ′(Πh−Πt) . Thus, we can obtain the relationship between va and Πb:
∫ v∗
va
dv
(δ + λ′)(v − 1) =
∫ Πb
Π∗
dΠ
λ′(Πh −Π) =⇒
(
1− va
1− v∗
) λ′
δ+λ′
=
Πh −Πb
Πh −Π∗ . (29)
Additionally, in region II, the slope of the phase path is represented by v˙t
Π˙t
= (δ+λ
′)(vt−1)
λ′(Πl−Πt) . Thus, we can obtain
the relationship between vc and Πb:
∫ vc
v∗
dv
(δ + λ′)(v − 1) =
∫ Π∗
Πb
dΠ
λ′(Πl −Π) =⇒
(
1− vc
1− v∗
) λ′
δ+λ′
=
Πb −Πl
Π∗ −Πl . (30)
From (29) and (30), we can derive the relationship between va and vc, eliminating Πb. The following formula
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summarizes the result, denoting λ
′
δ+λ′ as ρ
′:
(1− va)ρ′(Πh −Π∗) + (1− vc)ρ′(Π∗ −Πl) = (1− v∗)ρ′(Πh −Πl). (31)
Therefore, va is a function of vc in vc ∈ [0, v∗]: va(vc). Note that va(v∗) = v∗.
Similarly, from regions III and IV, we can derive the relationship between v′a and vc, eliminating Πd. In
region III, the slope of the phase path is represented by v˙t
Π˙t
= (δ+λ
′)vt
λ′(Πl−Πt) . Thus, we can find the relationship
between vc and Πd, ∫ v∗
vc
dv
(δ + λ′)v
=
∫ Πd
Π∗
dΠ
λ′(Πl −Π) =⇒
( vc
v∗
) λ′
δ+λ′ =
Πd −Πl
Π∗ −Πl . (32)
Additionally, in region IV, the slope of the phase path is represented by v˙t
Π˙t
= (δ+λ
′)vt
λ′(Πh−Πt) . Thus, we obtain the
relationship between va′ and Πd:
∫ va′
v∗
dv
(δ + λ′)v
=
∫ Π∗
Πd
dΠ
λ′(Πh −Π) =⇒
(va′
v∗
) λ′
δ+λ′ =
Πh −Πd
Πh −Π∗ . (33)
From (32) and (33), we obtain the following formula, which indicates the relationship between va′ and vc,
denoting λ
′
δ+λ′ as ρ
′:
vρ
′
a′ (Πh −Π∗) + vρ
′
c (Π
∗ −Πl) = v∗ρ′(Πh −Πl). (34)
Therefore, va′ is a function of vc in vc ∈ [0, v∗]: va′(vc). Note that va′(v∗) = v∗.
To prove the spiraling equilibrium path, the following two conditions, as depicted in Panel B of Ap-
pendix Figure 2, must be satisfied: (Condition 1) Two curves, va(vc) and va′(vc), are tangent at (v∗, v∗),
as dvadvc
∣∣
(v∗,v∗) =
dva′
dvc
∣∣
(v∗,v∗); and (Condition 2) va(vc) is concave and va′(vc) is convex in [0, v
∗], as d
2va
dv2c
< 0
and d
2va′
dv2c
> 0, ∀vc ∈ [0, v∗].
Proof of Condition 1. From equation (31), let us define the function F as F = (1− va)ρ′(Πh−Π∗)+ (1−
vc)ρ
′
(Π∗ − Πl) − (1 − v∗)ρ′(Πh − Πl) = 0. By the implicit function theorem, Fvadva + Fvcdvc = 0. Therefore,
we have
dva
dvc
= − (1− vc)
ρ′−1
(1− va)ρ′−1 ·
Π∗ −Πl
Πh −Π∗ . (35)
This indicates the slope of the curve va(vc) at (v∗, v∗): dvadvc
∣∣∣
(v∗,v∗)
= − Π∗−ΠlΠh−Π∗ . From equation (34), let us define
the function Z as Z = vρ
′
a′ (Πh − Π∗) + vρ
′
c (Π
∗ − Πl) − v∗ρ′(Πh − Πl) = 0. By the implicit function theorem,
Zva′dva′ + Zvcdvc = 0. Therefore, we have
dva′
dvc
= −v
ρ′−1
c
vρ
′−1
a′
· Π
∗ −Πl
Πh −Π∗ . (36)
This indicates the slope of the curve va′(vc) at (v∗, v∗):
dva′
dvc
∣∣∣
(v∗,v∗)
= − Π∗−ΠlΠh−Π∗ . Therefore, condition 1 is
satisfied.
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Proof of Condition 2. From equations (31) and (35), dvadvc can be expressed in terms of vc:
dva
dvc
= − (1− vc)
ρ′−1
[−(1− vc)ρ′(Π∗ −Πl) + (1− v∗)ρ′(Πh −Πl)]
ρ′−1
ρ′
· Π
∗ −Πl
(Πh −Π∗)
1
ρ′
. (37)
Taking the second derivative of this expression with respect to vc, we find that d
2va
dv2c
< 0 for δ > 0. From
equations (34) and (36), dva′dvc can be expressed in terms of vc,
dva′
dvc
= − v
ρ′−1
c
[−vρ′c (Π∗ −Πl) + v∗ρ′(Πh −Πl)]
ρ′−1
ρ′
· Π
∗ −Πl
(Πh −Π∗)
1
ρ′
. (38)
Taking the second derivative of this expression with respect to vc, we find that
d2va′
dv2c
> 0 for δ > 0. Therefore,
condition 2 is also satisfied.
Because the above two conditions are satisfied for δ > 0, we prove that the phase paths around the state
(v∗,Π∗) are spiraling. For example, given pio > Πl, when we assume that point d is (v∗, pio) and that the point
a′ is (1,Π∗), the above proof directly implies that the spiraling optimistic equilibrium path leads to (1,Π∗) and
then to Qh(1,Πh) in the (vt,Πt) domain. Given pip < Πh, the proof also implies that the spiraling pessimistic
equilibrium path leads to (0,Π∗) and then to Ql(0,Πl) in the (vt,Πt) domain. QED.
8.2 Proof of Corollary 2
We follow the modified dynamic system and the notation suggested in the proof of Proposition 4. Accordingly,
the following proof is based on the phase space in the (vt,Πt) domain. The slope of the equilibrium path in
region IV is Π˙tv˙t
∣∣
IV
= λ
′(Πh−Πt)
(δ+λ′)vt
. The first derivative of the slope is
d
dvt
[
Π˙t
v˙t
∣∣∣
IV
]
= −λ
′(Πh −Πt)
(δ + λ′)v2t
− λ
(δ + λ)vt
· dΠt
dvt
< 0.
Therefore, in region IV, the equilibrium paths are concave. The slope of the equilibrium path in region I is
Π˙t
v˙t
∣∣
IV
= λ(Πh−Πt)(δ+λ)(vt−1) . The first derivative of the slope is
d
dvt
[
Π˙t
v˙t
∣∣∣
I
]
= − λ
′(Πh −Πt)
(δ + λ′)(vt − 1)2 −
λ′
(δ + λ′)(vt − 1) ·
dΠt
dvt
< 0.
Therefore, in region I, the equilibrium paths are concave. In sum, on the right-hand side of the vt = v∗ line
(regions I and IV), the equilibrium paths are concave. Similarly, we can prove that the equilibrium paths are
convex on the left-hand side of the vt = v∗ line (regions II and III). QED.
8.3 Proof of Corollary 3
It is clear that agents with low investment costs who always invest are better off in steady state Qh than in
steady state Ql because they receive the benefit of the doubt in the temporary job market. Similarly, agents
with high investment costs who do not always invest are also better off in state Qh because they receive the
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benefit of the doubt, even though they did not invest in skills. The agents with the medium investment cost
cm invest in state Qh and do not invest in state Ql. Because the benefit of the doubt is given in state Qh, the
expected lifetime benefits are ωδ+λ −cm in this steady state, while the expected lifetime benefits are zero in state
Ql. The assumption in Lemma 1 guarantees that ωδ+λ − cm > 0. Therefore, all agents with different investment
costs are better off in steady state Qh than in steady state Ql. Let us now compare the profits of employers in
steady state Qh with those in steady state Ql.
First, consider agents in the temporary job market: the size of the population is N in. Expected profits at a
point of time in steady state Qh are the sum of N in ·Πl · xq (profits from workers with a low investment cost),
N in · (1−Πh) · (1−Pu)(−xu) (profits from workers with a high investment cost) and N in · (Πh−Πl) ·xq (profits
from workers with a medium investment cost). Therefore, total profits at a point of time are N in[Πh ·xq − (1−
Πh) · (1−Pu)xu] in steady state Qh, while expected profits in steady state Ql are N in ·Πl ·Pq · xq (profits from
workers with a low investment cost) because the profits from workers with a high investment cost and those
with a medium cost are zero. The condition Πl < Π∗ < Πh guarantees that profits from the population N in
are greater in state Qh than in state Ql.
Second, consider agents in the permanent job market: the size of the population is N i(1 − n). Expected
profits at a point in time are N i(1−n) ·Πh · xq in steady state Qh because both workers with a low investment
cost and those with a medium investment cost invest in skills, while profits in steady state Ql are N i(1−n)·Πl ·xq
because only workers with a low investment cost invest in skills. Thus, profits from the population N i(1 − n)
are greater in state Qh than in state Ql. QED.
8.4 Proof of Lemma 5
Consider a steady state (V¯ , Π¯) in the given the dynamic system. Linearization around the steady state (V¯ , Π¯)
yields
V˙t = (δ + λ′)(V¯ − βt(Π¯)− ω′)− (δ + λ′)β′t(Π¯)(Πt − Π¯) + (δ + λ′)(Vt − V¯ )
Π˙t = λ′(φt(V¯ )− Π¯)− λ′(Πt − Π¯) + λ′φ′t(V¯ )(Vt − V¯ ).
Because (V¯ , Π¯) is a steady state, both (δ + λ′)(V¯ − βt(Π¯) − ω′) and λ′(φt(V¯ ) − Π¯) are zero by definition.
Rearranging terms, we have
V˙t = (δ + λ′) · Vt − (δ + λ′)β′t(Π¯) ·Πt + (δ + λ′)[−V¯ + β′t(Π¯)Π¯]
Π˙t = λ′φ′t(V¯ ) · Vt − λ′ ·Πt + λ′[−φ′t(V¯ )V¯ + Π¯].
Therefore, the Jacobian matrix JE , evaluated at the steady state, is
JE ≡
δ + λ′ −(δ + λ′)β′t
λ′φ′t −λ′

(V¯ ,Π¯)
.
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Consequently, its transpose is trJE = δ, and the determinant is |JE | = λ′(δ + λ′)[β′tφ′t − 1]. Because trJE is
positive, every steady state is unstable.
Note that |JE | is negative if and only if
(
∂βt
∂Πt
)−1
> ∂φt∂Vt at (V¯ , Π¯). The first term,
(
∂βt
∂Πt
)−1
, indicates the
slope of the V˙ et = 0 locus in steady state (V¯ , Π¯) in the given (V
e
t ,Πt) domain, while the second term,
∂φt
∂Vt
,
indicates the slope of the Π˙t = 0 locus in the state (V¯ , Π¯). Therefore, the inequality requires that the slope of
the V˙ et = 0 locus is greater than the Π˙t = 0 locus in the state (V¯ , Π¯) in the given domain. This is always true
for the two steady states, Qh and Ql, provided there are a total of three steady states in the given dynamic
system, as is easily confirmed in Appendix Figure 1. In conclusion, each of the steady states, Qh and Ql, has
one positive and one negative characteristic roots. Therefore, they are saddle points.
Similarly, we can confirm that |JE | is positive at Qm because the following holds:
(
∂βt
∂Πt
)−1
< ∂φt∂Vt . This
implies that Qm is a source, either an unstable node or an unstable focus. QED.
8.5 Proof of Lemma 6
Note that based on the proof of Lemma 5, the characteristic roots are r1, r2 =
δ±
√
δ2−4λ′(δ+λ′)[β′tφ′t−1]
2 . Because
the proof of Lemma 5 shows that |JE | = λ′(δ+λ′)[β′tφ′t−1] > 0 at Qm, provided that δ2−4λ′(δ+λ′)[β′tφ′t−1](≡
D) is positive, both characteristic roots, r1 and r2, are distinct and positive. Therefore, when D > 0, Qm is
an unstable node, implying that the trajectories originating from the source Qm do not spiral out in the
neighborhood of Qm. Additionally, provided that D < 0, both characteristic roots are imaginary numbers,
implying that Qm is an unstable focus: the trajectories originating from the source spiral out. Note that
D > (<)0 ⇐⇒
(
1 + λ
′
δ
)
λ′
δ < (>)
1
4(φ′tβ
′
t−1)
∣∣∣
(Vm,Πm)
. QED.
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